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This paper addresses the issue of the macroeconomic instability of the output effects of 
government spending financed by money seigniorage. The contribution of the paper is to 
show that these output effects are dependent on where the economy is in relation to certain 
inflation thresholds and that these thresholds are affected by the degree of ‘substitutability’ 
between government spending and private consumption. When government spending has no 
intertemporal effect on private consumption, there exists a single inflation threshold. When 
government spending has an intertemporal effect on private consumption, there exist two 
inflation thresholds. As the economy crosses each inflation threshold, it will suffer a reversal 
of output effects.  
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1. Introduction 
In a classic paper, Cagan (1956) shows the actual rate of monetary growth and inflation in 
economies suffering from hyperinflation to far exceed the rate of seigniorage-maximizing 
monetary growth and inflation. For example, in the Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945-1946, 
the rate of seigniorage-maximizing monetary growth was estimated to be 32%, but the actual 
average monthly inflation rate was 12,200%. The reason that central banks keep increasing 
the rate of monetary growth and inflation to finance fiscal imbalances is simple. Imagine the 
central bank increases monetary growth from zero to some positive value in the first round to 
attain the seigniorage desired by the government. The rising inflation raises expected 
inflation and reduces the real demand for money, hence reducing real money seigniorage. As 
a result of the fall in seigniorage, the central bank would have to increase monetary growth in 
the second round to attain the desired seigniorage. This second-round increase in monetary 
growth increases inflation and reduces real money balances, lowering real seigniorage once 
more. This would then trigger a third-round of monetary growth, and so on. The result is high 
inflation and macroeconomic instability.  
 
In the above scenario, the central bank does not hold rational expectations. Because it holds 
adaptive expectations, it systematically makes mistakes in attaining the desired seigniorage. 
Suppose the central bank holds rational expectations and is able to attain the seigniorage it 
desires.
1 This would then eliminate the macroeconomic instability pointed out above.  
 
The objective of my paper is to show that, even with the assumption of rational expectations 
so that the macroeconomic instability mentioned above does not arise, there is another form 
of macroeconomic instability when government spending is financed by money seigniorage. 
This instability is that the output effects of such government spending can suffer reversals as   3
the inflation rate crosses certain threshold rates of monetary growth and inflation. The source 
of the macroeconomic instability of the output effects of government spending here arises 
from the interaction of two effects of government spending on savings. The first effect, called 
the intertemporal allocation effect, is due to intertemporal substitution between private 
consumption and government spending. An increase in government spending may increase 
private consumption and reduce saving if consumption is complementary with government 
spending, or decrease private consumption and increase saving if consumption is 
substitutable with government spending. The second effect, called the inflation effect, is due 
to the financing requirement of government spending. As government spending is increased, 
money seigniorage has to be increased; however, increasing money seigniorage is dependent 
upon where the economy is on the money-seigniorage Laffer curve. On the upward-sloping 
portion of the curve, increasing money seigniorage entails increasing monetary growth and 
inflation; on the downward-sloping portion of the curve, increasing money seigniorage 
entails decreasing monetary growth and inflation. Changes in inflation in turn changes 
savings. The interaction of the two effects causes an increase in government spending to 
affect savings, capital accumulation and output and result in expansionary or contractionary 
outcomes that depend on where the economy is in relation to the inflation thresholds 
mentioned earlier. This paper will show how and why the long-run effects of government 
spending financed by money seigniorage are dependent on the inflation thresholds and the 
degree of substitutability between government spending and private consumption. 
 
2. Model Formulation 
To achieve the objective of the paper, the model used is based on a deterministic version of 
the overlapping generations (OLG) model,
2 in which both money and government spending   4
enters into the utility function for consumers. All economic agents, including the government, 




Consumers live for two periods and form overlapping generations of constant size. In period 
t, a member of generation t supplies a unit of labor, earning a real wage rate of  t t t w τ ω − ≡ , 
where  t w  is the pre-tax real wage rate and  t τ  the labor-income tax. He consumes 
t
t c  of a 
private good and divides his income after consumption between saving 
t s  and holding a 
stock  1 + t m  of money at the end of period t, in real terms. Money earns no interest, while 
saving earns a real interest rate of rt+1 in period t+1. The consumer’s first-period budget 




t t P m P s P c P ω ≤ + + +1 , where  t P  is the money price of the private good in 
period t. In period t+1, he retires and consumes 
t
t c 1 + . His second period budget constraint is 
t
t t t t
t
t t s P i m P c P ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 + + + + + + ≤ , where  1 + t i  is the nominal interest rate. Eliminating 
t
ts P  from 
the budget constraints and using the exact relationship between the nominal and real interest 
rates,  ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 + + + + + = + t t t r i π , where  1 + t π  is the inflation rate in period t+1, the 












1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (.  
Each member of generation t also consumes a public good of amount  t g and  1 + t g  per capita in 
periods t and t+1 respectively. 
  
Consumer preferences are represented by a continuous, strictly quasi-concave and increasing 





t t m g g c c U m g c U . Consumers maximize utility subject 
to their budget constraints. Under the consumer regularity condition assumed, consumption, 
saving and money holdings are uniquely determined:    5
 
) , , , ( 1 1
t
t t t
t t g r c c + + = π ω ,  ) , , , ( 1 1
t
t t t
t t g r s s + + = π ω ,  ) , , , ( 1 1 1 1
t




t c  and  1 t m +  are normal, satisfying  1 / 0 < ∂ ∂ < t
t
t c ω  and  1 / 0 1 < ∂ ∂ ≡ < + t t m m ω ω , 
respectively, the derivatives of  ) , , , ( 1 1
t
t t t
t g r s + + π ω  and  ) , , , ( 1 1 1
t
t t t t g r m + + + π ω  are summarized 
in: 
 
Lemma 1: (a)  1 / 0 < ∂ ∂ ≡ < t
t s s ω ϖ ;  1 / + ∂ ∂ ≡ t
t
r r s s  is ambiguous in sign; 
0 / 1 > ∂ ∂ ≡ + t




g g s s g s s   ≤ or > 0 according as 




t g g c c g c c  ≥ or < 0. (b)  0 / 1 1 < ∂ ∂ ≡ + + t t r r m m ; 0 / 1 1 < ∂ ∂ ≡ + + t t m m π π .  
 
In Lemma 1,  2 1, g g c c   ≥ 0 is interpreted to mean that consumption of the private good in 
period t is complementary with, or independent of, consumption of the public good in periods 
t and t+1, and  2 1, g g c c  < 0 to mean that consumption of the private good in period t is 
substitutable for consumption of the public good in periods t and t+1. It is assumed that 
money holdings are independent of the consumption of the public good. It is clear that 




Producers are perfectly competitive, and produce a single good using labor and capital. Capital 
is simply production of the good that is not consumed in the previous period. On a per-capita 
basis,  t k  units of capital installed at the beginning of period t are employed together with one   6
unit of labor in period t to produce  t y  units of output. Production is subject to constant 
returns to scale. The per-capita production function,  ) ( t k F , is continuous, strictly concave 
and increasing. 
 
Following Tan (1995a), define a real unit-labor pre-wage profit function: 
 
} 0 ) , ( ; ) ( : max{ ) ( ≥ ≥ − ≡ Π t t t t t t t t k y y k F k r y r for 0 > t r .     (2) 
 
Assume the profit function is twice differentiable. Under constant returns to scale, profits are 
assumed to be zero. Hence, the wage rate is:  
 
) ( ) ( t t r r w Π = .            ( 3 )  
 
By Hotelling's (1932) Lemma, the demand for capital is  
 
t t t r r r k ∂ Π −∂ = / ) ( ) ( .              ( 4 )  
 
Under the monotonicity assumption of  ) ( t k F , it is well known that  0 / < ∂ ∂ ≡ t t r r k k . 
 
2.3 Government 
At the beginning of period t, the government has a per-capita stock  t M  of nominal money 
supply. During the period, the government issues new money and collects labor-income taxes 
of  t t Pτ  to finance its expenditure on a public good of  t tg P  per capita. The per-capita stock of   7
money will accumulate to  1 + t M  by the end of period t. The per-capita government-budget 
constraint for period t is  
 
t t t t t t g P P M M = + − + τ 1 .          ( 5 a )  
 
Dividing (5a) by  t P  yields the real per-capita government budget constraint: 
 
t t t t t g m m = + − + + + τ π 1 1) 1 ( .                         (5b) 
 
Assuming equilibrium in the money market and substituting the money demand function in 
(1) into (5b) yields
4 
 
t t t t t t t t t t t t t g r r w m r r w m = + − − − + − − + + + + τ π τ π τ π ] , , ) ( [ ] , , ) ( [ ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 .               (5c) 
 
Let  t g  be the exogenous policy variable and  t τ  be fixed at  τ τ = t . Then the policy variable, 
1 + t π , is endogenous: 
 
 ) , , , ( 1 1 1 t t t t t t g r r π π π + + + = .          ( 6 a )  
 
It follows that 
 
  ) , , , ( 1 1 1 − − − = t t t t t t g r r π π π .                         (6b) 
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Since  ) , , ( 1 1 1 − − − t t t g r π  are predetermined, they can be omitted from (6b): 
 
) ( t t t r π π = .                             (6c) 
 
Substituting (6c) into (6a) yields 
 
  ) , , ( 1 1 1 t t t t t g r r + + + =π π .                          (6d) 
 
In the steady state, (5c) simplifies to  
 
g r r w m = + − τ π τ π ] , , ) ( [ .            ( 5 ' )  
 
Then (6d) becomes simply 
 
  ) , ( g r π π = ,              ( 6 ' )  
where 
 ) /( ) ( / π ω π π π π m m m km r r r + − = ∂ ∂ ≡ ,         
) /( 1 / π π π π m m g g + = ∂ ∂ ≡ .                           (7') 
 
In general,  r π  and  g π  are ambiguous in sign. (7') will be used to determine the signs of the 
derivatives in the next two subsections.   9
2.4 Capital Market 
The capital market is in equilibrium at the end of period t when 
 
   ) ( ) , , , ( 1 1 1 + + + = t
t
t t t
t r k g r s π ω .                        (8a) 
 
The equilibrium in (8a) is partial equilibrium. We are, however, interested in general 
equilibrium. To convert condition (8a) to one that expresses general equilibrium, use (8a) in 
conjunction with (6d) to define a (reduced-form) per-capita excess-supply-of-saving 
function: 
 
  ) ( ] ), ), ( , , ( , , ) ( [ ) , , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + + − − ≡ t
t
t t t t t t t t
t t
t t t r k g g r r r r r w s g r r π π τ α .     (9) 
 
This summary function embodies utility maximization by consumers, profit maximization by 
producers, and compliance with the government budget constraint, and is introduced to 
simplify the analysis for the rest of the paper. 
 
In the steady state, function (9) reduces to  
 
) ( ] ), , ( , , ) ( [ ) , ( r k g g r r r w s g r − − ≡ π τ α .          ( 9 ' )  
 
The partial derivatives of α(r,g) are, respectively, 
 
  r r r r s k s k s r π α α π ω + − − = ∂ ∂ ≡ /,  
g g g s s g + = ∂ ∂ ≡ π α α π / .                         (10')   10
 
The sign of  r α  will be determined in the next subsection. Using (7') and (10'), the sign of  g α  
 is summarized in: 
 
Lemma 2: (a) For  0 = g s ,  g α  > or < 0 according as π  < or >  ) / ( * π π m m − = . (b) For 
0 < g s ,  g α  > 0 if  ) / ( ) / ( 1 π π π π m s s m m g − − =  < π  < ) / ( * π π m m − =  and  g α  < 0 if π  < 
1 π  or π  >  * π . (c) For  0 > g s ,  g α  < 0 if  * π  < π  <  ) / ( ) / ( 2 π π π π m s s m m g − − =  and  g α  > 
0 if π  <  * π  or π  >  2 π . 
 
Lemma 2 determines the sign of  g α  for each of the three cases: public spending is 
independent of, complementary with, or substitutable for, private consumption.  
 
2.5 General Equilibrium 
Making use of the excess-supply-of-savings function defined by (9), the evolution of the 
economy is written simply as 
 
0 ) , , ( 1 1 = + + t t t t g r r α .                           (11) 
 
A temporary (general) equilibrium is an  1 + t r  > 0 satisfying the capital-market equilibrium 
condition (11) for given  ) , ( t t g r . In the steady state, the economy settles down to 
 
0 ) , ( = g r α .                             (11') 
    11
A steady-state equilibrium is an r > 0 satisfying equilibrium condition (11') for a given g. 
The condition for stability of the steady-state equilibrium is summarized in  
 
Lemma 3: Under consumption normality and local Walrasian stability at a temporary 




For the purpose of this paper, the model comprises  
 
0 ) , ( = g r α ,                             (11') 
  ) (r k k = .                             (12') 
 
Equation (11') determines the real interest rate for a given g. With r determined, (12') 
determines the capital-labor ratio.  
 
The issue to be addressed is the effect of a change in g on k. 
 
3. Results 
Suppose that government spending is increased by a small amount dg  > 0. The model 
comprising (11')-(12') can be differentiated at the initial equilibrium to yield: 
 
dg dr g r α α − = ,                           (13') 
dr k dk r = .                             (14') 
   12
Using (13'), as a result of increasing government spending by dg > 0, the real interest rate in 
the steady state will change by  
 
dg dr g r α α
1 ) (
− − = .                           (15') 
 
Using (15') to eliminate dr from (14'), the capital-labor ratio in the steady state will change by 
 
dg k dk g r r α α
1 ) (
− − = .                          (16') 
 
Since  r k  < 0,  r α  > 0 by Lemma 3, and dg  > 0 by assumption, we have dk  > or < 0 
according as  g α  > or < 0. Using Lemma 2, we have the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: Assume  0 = g s . Let government spending be increased by a small amount 
dg  > 0. Then, subject to the assumptions of the model, the capital-labor ratio satisfies dk  > 
or < 0 according as π  < or >  ) / ( * π π m m − = . 
 
Proposition 2: Assume  0 < g s . Let government spending be increased by a small amount 
dg  > 0. Then, subject to the assumptions of the model, the capital-labor ratio satisfies dk  > 
0 if  ) / ( ) / ( 1 π π π π m s s m m g − − =  < π  < ) / ( * π π m m − =  and dk  < 0 if π  <  1 π  or π  >  * π .  
 
Proposition 3: Assume  0 > g s . Let government spending be increased by a small amount 
dg  > 0. Then, subject to the assumptions of the model, the capital-labor ratio satisfies dk  > 
0 if π  <  * π  or π  > ) / ( ) / ( 2 π π π π m s s m m g − − =  and dk  < 0 if  * π  < π  <  2 π .   13
 
What do Propositions 1-3 say about macroeconomic instability? Proposition 1 shows that, when 
public and private spending are independent, there is a single inflation threshold of 
) / ( * π π m m − = , the crossing of which leads to a reversal of the effects of fiscal policy. 
Increasing government spending is expansionary below  * π  but contractionary above it. 
Proposition 2 shows that, when public and private spending are complementary, there are two 
inflation thresholds,  ) / ( ) / ( 1 π π π π m s s m m g − − =  and  * π . Crossing each of these thresholds 
again leads to a reversal of the effects of fiscal policy. Below  1 π , increasing government 
spending is contractionary. Between  1 π  and  * π , increasing government spending is 
expansionary. Crossing the threshold of  * π , increasing government spending is once more 
contractionary. Proposition 3 shows that, when public and private spending are substitutable, 
there are again two inflation thresholds,  * π  and  ) / ( ) / ( 2 π π π π m s s m m g − − = . Below  * π , 
increasing government spending is expansionary. Between  * π  and  2 π , increasing 
government spending is contractionary. Crossing the threshold of  2 π , increasing government 
spending becomes once more expansionary. If governments have no knowledge of these 
inflation thresholds, do not care about the degree of substitutability between public and 
private spending but do care about the output effects of government spending, then they are 
in for some surprise. 
 
To explain the economic rationale of the propositions, note from the identity of  g α  in (10') that 
government spending affects the supply of savings through two channels. First, government 
spending affects savings through its effect on monetary growth and inflation. Second, 
government spending affects savings through its effect on private consumption. Call the first   14
channel, the inflation effect of government spending, and the second channel, the 
intertemporal allocation effect of government spending.  
 
When public and private consumption are independent ( 0 = g s ), government spending has a 
positive effect on the supply of savings for initial inflation rates below the seigniorage-
maximizing inflation rate of  * π  and a negative effect for rates above  * π .
6 The seigniorage-
maximizing inflation rate is the inflation rate corresponding to the turning point of the 
money-seigniorage Laffer curve. In this case, only the first channel of government spending 
is operative. When the initial inflation rate is below  * π , the economy is on the upward-
sloping portion of the money-seigniorage Laffer curve, along which money seigniorage 
increases with inflation, so an increase in government spending, which has to be financed by 
an increase in money seigniorage, entails raising monetary growth and inflation, hence 
increasing savings and capital accumulation. However, when the initial inflation rate exceeds 
* π , the economy is on the downward-sloping portion of the money-seigniorage Laffer 
curve, along which money seigniorage decreases with increasing inflation, in which case an 
increase in government spending entails lowering monetary growth and inflation, so 
decreasing savings and capital accumulation. 
 
When government spending and private consumption are complementary ( 0 < g s ), the 
second channel of government spending becomes operative in addition to the first. In this 
case, through the second channel, an increase in government spending increases private 
consumption and decreases savings. Superimposing this intertemporal allocation effect onto 
the inflation effect of government spending, it is clear that the intertemporal allocation effect 
reinforces the inflation effect above  * π  but works against it below  * π . Below  * π , 
therefore, the net effect of government spending on savings depends on which effect   15
dominates. At low inflation rates (below  ) / ( ) / ( 1 π π π π m s s m m g − − = ),
7 the inflation effect is 
weak and the intertemporal allocation effect dominates; hence, an increase in government 
spending decreases savings and capital accumulation. At higher inflation rates, between  1 π  
and  * π , the inflation effect dominates, so an increase in government spending increases 
savings and capital accumulation.  
 
The rationale for the case where government spending and private consumption ( 0 > g s ) are 
substitutable can be similarly explained. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper addresses the issue of the macroeconomic instability of the long-run output effects 
of government spending financed by money seigniorage. The contribution of the paper is to 
show that the output effects are dependent on where the economy is in relation to certain 
inflation thresholds and that these thresholds are affected by the degree of ‘substitutability’ 
between government spending and private consumption. When government spending has no 
intertemporal effect on private consumption, there exists a single inflation threshold. When 
government spending has an intertemporal effect on private consumption, there exist two 
inflation thresholds. As the economy crosses each inflation threshold, the economy suffers a 
reversal of the output effects. While the macroeconomic instability of hyperinflations based 
on adaptive expectations, as in the work of Cagan (1956), is well known, the macroeconomic 
instability identified in this paper, based on rational expectations, appears not to have been 
documented in the literature.  
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Notes 
                                                           
1 We are not assuming that the central bank is necessarily aiming for the seigniorage-
maximizing rate of monetary growth. 
2 Samuelson (1958) and Allais are pioneers of the OLG model. See Malinvaud (1987) on 
Allais’ publication of the OLG model in 1947. Most deterministic versions of the OLG model 
are usually descendants of Diamond’s (1965) version of the OLG model. 
3 In the absence of uncertainty, assuming rational expectations is equivalent to assuming 
perfect foresight. 
4 Bear in mind that money holdings are independent of consumption of the public good. 
5 See Tan (1995b) for a proof of the stability condition. The existence and uniqueness of the 
steady-state equilibrium are also considered in Tan (1995b).  
6 The sign of  ) / ( * π π m m − =  is positive since  π m  is negative. 
7 Since  π m  is negative,  π s  is positive and  g s  is negative when public and private 
consumption are complementary,  ) / ( ) / ( 1 π π π π m s s m m g − − =  is less than  ) / ( * π π m m − = . 